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ARTICLES
SEPARATION OF POWERS AFTER THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL DECISION
George J. Alexander*
In the recent past, the Supreme Court has invented solutions to
separation of powers problems that are notable for their lack of po-
litical reality. It has invalidated election reform, congressional legis-
lative vetoes and a version of the Gramm-Rudman (deficit reduction)
Act, all in the purported interest of preserving executive power from
legislative interference. Faced with a need to condemn review by in-
dependent counsel of alleged administration misconduct, it finally, in
Morrison v. Olsen,' gave up its rigidity and adopted a balancing
test.
While the rationale of Morrison is dubious, its result seems cor-
rect. This article suggests that the new "test" proposed in Morrison
could have provided different (and better) results in other recently
decided cases and that it may do so in future cases. It also suggests
that the Supreme Court should decline to hear cases presenting sepa-
ration of powers issues in favor of allowing one of the other two
branches of government to resolve them.
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL DECISION
In Morrison, the Supreme Court upheld the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act2 against challenges which included infringement of the
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1. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. 1988).
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presidential appointment power' and violation of separation of
power guarantees.4 An independent counsel appointed under the Act
was vindicated in challenges to her authority.
Under the Act, an independent counsel is appointed by a Spe-
cial Division of the United States Court of Appeals on petition by
the Attorney General. The Attorney General is compelled to conduct
a preliminary investigation if he receives information which is "suffi-
cient to constitute grounds to investigate whether [specified people
have] . . . violated any Federal criminal law." 5 If, after investiga-
tion, he concludes that no further inquiries are necessary, he is re-
quired to report that fact to the Special Division. Otherwise, he must
petition for an independent counsel.'
The Special Division of the Court of Appeals which appoints
the independent counsel also frames his or her authority.' The Act
essentially gives counsel the power of the Attorney General to inves-
tigate and prosecute within the jurisdictional limits established.
Counsel's action is not unbridled in that he or she is obligated to
follow Department policy "except when not possible." 8 Further, he
or she is subject to removal by the Attorney General for good cause.9
Otherwise, counsel serves until he or she resigns or is terminated by
the Special Division acting on its own or on a suggestion by the
Attorney General.1
In Morrison, three former government employees challenged
the constitutionality of the Act. The United States district court re-
jected their claims" but the court of appeals, in a divided opinion,
reversed and held the law unconstitutional. 2 The Supreme Court
reversed again, rejecting several arguments in reaching this decision.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. 1988).
6. Id. § 49. Section 592(0 requires that the decision must be made and reported to the
court within ninety days. Failure to conclude the preliminary investigation by the end of
ninety days authorizes the appointment of a special counsel without a petition by the Attorney
General. Id. An Attorney General's decision not to seek independent counsel is expressly made
non-reviewable by federal courts. Id. § 592(0.
7. Id. § 593(b).
8. Id. § 594(0.
9. Id. § 596(a)(1). If counsel is removed for cause, a report of the removal and facts
leading to the removal must be submitted both to the Special Division and to Congress. Id. §
596(a)(2). Although counsel may obtain judicial review of the decision to remove, the Special
Division is expressly barred from hearing the case. Id. § 596(a)(3).
10. Id. § 596(b)(2).
11. In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
12. Sealed, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Chief among these arguments was that the law violated the appoint-
ments clause"3 and offended separation of powers principles by
abridging the President's executive powers."'
Speaking to a central consideration respecting separation of
power, the Chief Justice opined, "We first observe that this case does
not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own power at the
expense of the executive branch. . . .Unlike some of our previous
cases, most recently Bowsher v. Synar, this case simply does not pose
a '[danger] of Congressional usurpation of Executive Branch func-
tions.' ""i The majority opinion itself will be explored in detail later
in this article.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia not only disagreed with the deci-
sion but thought the contrary response self-evident.16 He challenged
many aspects of the majority decision, but was primarily concerned
that the President's exclusive executive power had been invaded by
both the judicial appointment of the independent counsel and by ju-
dicial and congressional supervision of such independent counsel."'
Although he was alone in his dissent, 8 it is easy to find support for
Scalia's perspective in the recent history of Supreme Court
adjudication.
THE SHIFT OF POWER TEST CONTRASTED WITH THE EXCLUSIVE
FUNCTION TEST
Morrison purported to abandon the exclusive function test (for
which Justice Scalia continued to argue) in favor of an approach
which balances multiple factors. The latter scheme represents a
shifting of power test in which one of several measures of a separa-
tion of powers violation is the extent to which power is actually
shifted from one branch of government to another." Thus, the im-
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .Officers of the United States . . .but
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States."
15. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986)).
16. "If to describe this case is not to decide it, the concept of a government of separate
and coordinate powers no longer has meaning." Id. at 2625 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 2622.
18. Justice Kennedy did not participate. All other Justices, except Justice Scalia, joined
the opinion.
19. Although the opinion never used "power shifting" language, the three factors ad-
dressed in the opinion included: (1) no congressional usurpation of executive branch functions;
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portance of the Chief Justice's comment that there had been no
usurpation of power by Congress in Morrison.
Applying the exclusive function test in Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha,0 the Supreme Court ruled that one
house vetoes are unconstitutional. Chadha involved a statute al-
lowing the Attorney General to stay the deportation of deportable
aliens. Congress had provided that such a stay could be reversed by
vote of either house of Congress. The Court found the one-house
veto unconstitutional and declared that Congress can only act legisla-
tively by bicameral action 1 and with presentment22 to the President.
By attempting to supervise executive action, Congress had usurped
presidential power. It had assumed an aspect of executing laws by
retaining the power to overrule specific applications of executive
power.
This article proposes that rigid lines of division among the three
branches are not constitutionally established.2" Assuming this argu-
ment to be correct, the exclusive functions test would often have to
yield to other considerations, suggesting a lack of rigid division.
However, in Chadha, such other considerations were rejected. For
example, the Court was unpersuaded by the large number of bills
containing similar one or two house veto provisions.24 Also uncon-
vincing was the fact that the legislative veto provision (as every legis-
lative veto provision) was established by a law which itself complied
with the formalities the Court found lacking in its administration
(i.e., bicameral adoption and presentment).
The test proposed in Morrison would not have supported the
result in Chadha. Further, that test does not support the result in
Morrison itself. In Morrison, the Court said, "[w]e observe first that
this case does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own
powers at the expense of the Executive branch."25 That statement
seems incorrect as applied to the independent counsel law but is
surely a correct description of the one-house veto invalidated in
(2) no judicial usurpation of executive functions; and (3) the absence of an impermissible un-
dermining of executive powers. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620-21. A similar approach was used
in a later case decided while this article was in revision. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647 (1989).
20. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
22. Id. cl. 2 & 3.
23. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
24. Justice White pointed out that the decision invalidated more laws than the Court
had declared void in its entire history. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967, 1002 (White, J., dissenting).




Justice Scalia carefully explained how the independent counsel
law enlarges the power of Congress. In short, he thinks the law pro-
vides an opportunity for a majority of Congress to harass an admin-
istration of the other party by initiating criminal investigations of
key personnel.2" While Congress gains that power, for whatever it is
worth, the President does not gain any power he did not have before
the law, unless the additional guarantee of lawful governance could
be considered power. Power is shifted away from the President to-
ward Congress. Applying the Court's test, as Justice Scalia points
out, leads to a result opposite the one the Court actually reached.2
Each legislative veto provision, on the other hand, is an example
of a quid pro quo bargain between the two branches. The executive
branch obtains, without strings, broader authority than Congress
would be inclined to grant. Congress is relieved of the burden of
passing laws which foresee and prescribe remedies for future
problems in administering the law. Thus, if the shift of power test is
appropriate, Chadha is also incorrectly decided.
Indeed, most legislation could be upheld against constitutional
challenge in a similar manner using the shift of power test. Unless
Congress has passed a law over the President's veto, it is likely that
the law deals fairly with the powers of both branches. Otherwise, the
disadvantaged branch would have prevented its passage. However, as
Justice Scalia has suggested, the Ethics in Government Act may be
an exception." It may have been so politically expensive to reject
such an Act that the President was forced to sign it.
On the other hand, if Justice Scalia is correct in applying the
exclusive functions test, his dissent appears to have overlooked exclu-
sive legislative functions. Both he and the Court seem to have sanc-
tioned the delegation of legislative power to the Attorney General in
the administration of the Independent Counsel Act." Yet, legislative
power is given to Congress in exactly the language used to give exec-
utive power to the President."0 How can it be unconstitutional for
26. Id. at 2625, 2630, 2638, 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 2630.
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. 1988).
29. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
30. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States."), with, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.").
The delegation cases purport to distinguish delegation with an "intelligible purpose" from
actual grants of legislative power to other branches, said to be unconstitutional. In fact, of
course, the dearth of cases striking down laws on delegation grounds attests to the fact that the
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the President's executive authority of prosecution to be diminished
while it remains acceptable for Congress to shift its power to the
President?
THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Similar separation of powers principles have resulted from in-
terpretations of the Appointments Clause."' In Buckley v. Valeo,8"
the Court reviewed the Election Campaign Act which, among other
things, provided public funds and set standards for Presidential cam-
paigns.88 One of the issues in the case concerned the appointment of
the supervising members of the Federal Election Commission. The
Act provided that some members would be appointed by the Presi-
dent and others by Congress. In its decision, the Supreme Court
struck the provisions for congressional appointment, indicating that
the President has the exclusive authority to appoint officers of the
United States."
To say that the President is given power not shared by Con-
gress to appoint officers of the United States says nothing particu-
larly startling. In the scheme of the Constitution, the President's role
centers on his obligation to see laws faithfully executed." He and
the heads of his departments must generally direct the officers who
carry out that obligation. It is also not unreasonable to consider his
authority as fairly absolute vis-a-vis those whose primary task is
ministerial, such as postmasters. 8 In Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,87 the Court was able to distinguish between such of-
ficers and others whose roles were more complex and who would be
unable to serve their functions if they were not independent. Thus,
federal administrative commissioners were held to be immunized
from summary presidential dismissal by act of Congress. Had that
decision been different, administrative agencies would not have be-
come a significant factor in legal development. Many decisions made
by them would have been left to the courts. The advantage of spe-
cialized consideration and adjudication would have been lost unless
article I provision has been read far less rigidly than article II. See generally Mistretta v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
33. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1982).
34. The statute was later altered to allow the President to make all appointments.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, el. 8.
36. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
37. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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some type of article III specialized court had been established."8 As
things turned out, losing independent administrative agencies would
have damaged presidential power more than it would have under-
mined the power of Congress. Such agencies are more beholden to
the executive branch and its agenda than to Congress. 9 It is signifi-
cant to note, however, that agencies are able to maintain a degree of
independence from both branches4 0 despite the fact that they are at
least theoretically as much under the control of Congress, which sets
their agenda and provides them funds, as is the Comptroller General
who, the Court has said, is a legislative agent.4 In short, these agen-
cies could not perform in the expected manner without some inde-
pendence from both branches.
It would be foolish to argue that the drafters of the Constitution
or the voters who adopted it had a fourth branch of government in
mind. Even the branches they described were offices of limited scope.
But to admit that an idea would not have occurred to Americans two
hundred years ago is hardly to say it is unconstitutional now. Even
in that distant past, the Constitution was made flexible enough to
allow for lines of executive responsibility that did not end in the
White House.4 2
Applying the Appointments Clause and the exclusive functions
test, the Court in Bowsher v. Synar4" struck down a central provi-
sion of the Gramm-Rudman Budget Reduction Act44 that allowed
the Comptroller General of the United States to apply dollar figures
to the percentage budget cuts provided in the Act. The Court found
38. Cf Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(non-article III bankruptcy court held unconstitutional).
39. "[T]he President [has power] to affect rulemaking by transferring programs among
agencies, by abolishing some rulemaking functions, by deferring spending, by withholding the
administration's support from agency budget and legislative requests, and by selecting agency
chairmen. These powers allow the President to exert indirect but significant influence on
agency policymaking." Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE
L.J. 451, 494-95 (1978-79); see also Strauss, The Places of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
40. "The power to make independent choices permits an agency, within its mandate, not
only to act on its own initiative, but also to resist being directly checked by those who disagree
with its decisions. . . . Freed from the interference of all but large majorities, an agency can
undertake ongoing regulation through a process of low-consensus-and hence relatively unac-
countable-decisionmaking." Note, Delegation and Regulatory Reform: Letting the President
Change the Rules, 89 YALE L.J. 561, 571 (1980).
41. The Court admits as much. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2618 n.28 (1988).
See infra note 46 for a discussion of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
42. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
44. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. 1986).
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the Comptroller General too beholden to Congress to serve constitu-
tionally in what it characterized as an executive function."5
For the Court, the ability of Congress to remove the Comptrol-
ler General by impeachment or by joint resolution on grounds of
inefficiency, neglect of duty or other listed causes"6 made him a legis-
lative official. However, requiring him to make the budget cutting
recommendations involved him in executive functions. The Court an-
nounced that to permit Congress to remove the Comptroller General
would effectively give it control over enforcement of laws he adminis-
tered. This result would be similar to a legislative veto, since Con-
gress could remove an offending executive functionary by its own
action.
APPLYING THE SHIFT OF POWER TEST
By the time Morrison was decided, the Court had lost its enthu-
siasm for applying the exclusive function test to executive functions.
Indeed, it seems to have lost its conviction that it could clearly iden-
tify those functions. The Court in Morrison surprisingly quoted
with approval Justice White's dissent in Bowsher which had indi-
cated that the powers of FTC Commissioners (which the Court held
were not subject to peremptory removal by the President) "would at
the present time be considered 'executive,' at least to some degree." '47
Morrison adopted what this author has called the shift of power test
and what Justice Scalia condemned as a "totality of the circum-
45. The majority opinion argues that the Comptroller is a congressional agent both be-
cause of the nature of congressional control over his tenure and because he has been held out
so to serve. For the last twelve years this author has been a consultant to the two incumbent
Comptroller Generals. The opinion therefore seems especially curious to him. Nothing the
author has observed in the functioning of the office gives the slightest clue that the Comptroller
General or any of his principal subordinates shares those conclusions. In the entire history of
the office, no Congress has ever dismissed an incumbent. No proceedings to dismiss have ever
been initiated and, as far as the author has been able to discover, none have been publicly
suggested. That fact may seem surprising to those believing the majority's account of how the
office functions because it is often the case that control of Congress changes during the term of
a Comptroller General. Committee chairs are routinely replaced in such shifts. The Comptrol-
ler General, who is appointed by the President, is never replaced, despite the fact that dis-
missing the incumbent would (if one accepts the Court's view of the office) give the new party
a person attuned to their perspectives rather than to the perspectives of the deposed political
party. Alexander, On Knowing One's Place: Constitutional Roles and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 12 OKLA. CITY UNIv. L. REV. 807, 810-11 (1987).
46. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provides for removal on the following
grounds: permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, commission of a fel-
ony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-779 (1982).




stances" approach.48 Applying this less absolute standard, can Bow-
sher stand?
As in Chadha, the Court's opinion in Bowsher missed the reali-
ties of governmental cooperation and dispute resolution. It again in-
correctly opined that the law involved a congressional arrogation of
power wrested from the President. Viewed realistically, the function
of the Comptroller General was, as in the legislative veto instance,
the result of a necessary compromise between the two branches. Both
wanted the Act and neither trusted the other to have final disposi-
tional authority. They found someone who seemed-to this author as
well-to be a relatively neutral party. Right or wrong, there is no
reason to believe that a power shift would have taken place had
there been no Supreme Court intervention.
Furthermore, even if the Comptroller General had drawn some
power from the President, there is little reason to identify that power
as shifting to Congress. To call him a legislative officer on the basis
of the right of Congress to remove him for cause makes far too much
of the removal power. There are many ways in which the Comptrol-
ler General is beholden to Congress. Congress can hamstring his
work by legislation in exactly the same manner it can hamstring any
branch of government. It can cut his appropriations so as effectively
to eliminate his work. Perhaps Congress can even eliminate the posi-
tion of Comptroller General despite his present fifteen year contract.
Alternatively, it can increase the Comptroller General's work, re-
quire him to make additional reports to Congress or to its commit-
tees, or provide that additional steps be taken prior to the completion
of work. In all of these respects, the Comptroller General bears no
distinction from any other federal employee. All of these restrictions
apply to the President and to the courts. Surely the threats of such
reprisals do not convert either the executive branch or the courts into
legislative agents. Yet the power to impose such draconian measures,
which are customary in more moderate forms,49 is a far more impos-
ing threat to the Comptroller General than the threat of outright
dismissal, which Congress has never attempted.
Morrison is equally curious when it discusses the issue of the
Appointments Clause. The Chief Justice's opinion attempts to limit
the holding by stating that the President has retained some control
48. 108 S. Ct. at 2641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. For example, the President has a duty to report to Congress under the War Powers
Resolution. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1982). Conceivably, Congress can get tougher than that. See Ex
Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868) (removing Supreme Court jurisdiction as it was
about to hear a case).
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over independent counsel through a variety of provisions. Among
such provisions is the Attorney General's ability to dismiss indepen-
dent counsel for cause. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States,50 the Court approved limiting presiden-
tial removal power by requiring that he have good cause before dis-
missing Federal Trade Commissioners." In the same way, the At-
torney General's "control" in terms of his ability specifically to
request independent counsel is so circumscribed that a failure to ex-
ercise that power might leave him quite politically vulnerable.52
Unlike the previously discussed cases, it is not enough to point
out that the Ethics in Government Act was enacted with bicameral
passage and the President's signature. Perhaps the President was
weakened by the realization that to oppose the law might give
credence to the "sleaze factor" arguments put forth by his critics.53
Perhaps Congress finally did pass a law which reassigned a portion
of the President's power. Justice Scalia argued that such a reassign-
ment would invade separation of powers doctrine. The majority
seemed to agree that such a result would occur but for the aspects of
"control" discussed above. However, both conclusions take too sim-
plistic a view of separation of powers.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
The essential problem in the Court's approach to separation of
power is a misperception of the constitutional design. The Court has
apparently conceptualized the three branches of government as es-
sentially independent and has branded any functional overlap a vio-
lation of separation of powers. The power which checks usurpation
by another branch is, presumably, the inability of that branch to
reach into the functioning of a sister group.
Checks and balances in the Constitution function differently.
All branches need the other two in some respects; this need con-
strains their power. Of course, the three branches are designed to
50. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
51. Justice Scalia prefers a more colorful description as evidenced by his statement,
"This is somewhat like referring to shackles as an effective means of locomotion." Morrison,
108 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. The Attorney General must specifically request independent counsel even though he
is directed to do so barring "no reasonable grounds to believe" that further investigation is
required. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (b)(1) (Supp. 1988). The independent counsel is directed to follow
Justice Department general policy; the only exception being when such allegiance is not possi-
ble. This results in a somewhat ambiguous standard. Id. § 592(0.
53. Roberts, The Oval Office: Espousing 'High Morality' and Living With Scandal,
L.A. Daily J., May 26, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
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prevent arrogations of power in the others and in part this is accom-
plished by separating their functions and providing a place for each.
In important respects, however, just the opposite is true. One branch
has a specific significant role in the functioning of another branch.
Impeachment, which has already been mentioned, serves as an ex-
ample. Impeachment would appear to be a judicial function, but is
given to the Legislature. When Congress sits in its most intrusive
capacity, that is, when it is charging the President, the Supreme
Court participates through the Chief Justice, who presides at the
trial.A If the President does not follow the law, Congress need not
function through bicameral legislation and present its findings to the
object of its inquiry for approval."
Other examples abound. At least one important control is given
each branch in the operation of the others. Legislation is presented to
the President not only for execution but initially for approval.5" If he
withholds his approval, the Legislature is forced to repass the legis-
lation by a two-thirds vote to make it law.57 Thus, in effect, the
President is the most important legislator because his vote counts as
much as the votes of one sixth of each house, less one member of that
house. The courts are equally controlled by Congress. The Constitu-
tion expressly allows Congress to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.58 The Supreme Court, in turn,
acts as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of congressional legis-
lation 9 and presidential action.60 The President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, fills the Court's vacancies.61
In the grand design of the Constitution, balance of power is in
significant part created precisely by cooperative integrated roles. To
force any one of the three branches into the strict compartmentaliza-
tion sought by the Court would dramatically alter the structure the
founders and voters created.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
55. We might have learned more about this process had the Supreme Court not arro-
gated the impeachment inquiry in President Nixon's case by resolving the central question of
the public's ability to hear his taped office conversations. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
57. Id.
58. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
59. That power is not found in the express language of the Constitution but dates from
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and has become part of the conventional
wisdom of our culture.
60. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (popularly known
as the Steel Seizure case).
61. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN SEPARATION OF POWER
The tragedy of the Morrison decision does not, however, lie
simply in the Court's misperception of reality. The isolation from
political life that generates such problems is closely linked to an es-
sential function the Court performs when it must hold out for consti-
tutional values against the prejudices of the day.6" It is such isolation
that allowed the Court to break the log jam of racial discrimination
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.6" The Court's isolation
likewise broke suburban dominance in political representation by an-
nouncing that the Constitution required "one man, one vote"" ' and
allowed sexual expression that in many states had been suppressed
by legislative enactment of majoritarian morality.65 Of course, the
Court's major human rights blunders must be thrown into the bal-
ance.66 Even so, the Court's record of protection of individual rights
over time is remarkable and its role in these endeavors was pioneer-
ing. One can partially attribute the autonomy about which Ameri-
cans are proud to the Constitution and a Supreme Court that insists
the Constitution be followed even when its edicts are unpopular.6"
In the protection of other rights, the record of the Court is less
enviable. Lochner v. New York " stands out as an agreed example of
a prior Court's excesses in pursuing its view of ordered liberty.6
62. That fact was recognized by the drafters. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A.
Hamilton). Ironically, Justice Scalia invokes it in Morrison to suggest that the Court is the
only branch of government politically capable of opposing The Ethics in Government Act.
Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2639 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of course, the same isolation allowed the Court to create the
problem by announcing in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that separate equality was
constitutionally sufficient.
64. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964).
65. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Later, the Court's isolation tended to
dampen the effects of changing sexual mores. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (homosexual sodomy); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 493 U.S. 1052 (1978)
(adultery).
66. E.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (approving criminalization of homosexual sex);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (approving Japanese-American citizen war-
time forced relocation); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (treating freed slaves
as property). The Court's unrealistic view of political reality has led it astray in other fields as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy foreclosed to those who
cannot pay filing fee); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (low
price of coal during Great Depression was largely due to necessary coal by-products and ag-
gressive marketing); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (employees had liberty to alter
the conditions of employment by contract).
67. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 53, 59-60.
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
69. See, e.g., Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11
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There are many similar examples from an era in which the Court
thought its protection of individual economic autonomy required it to
oppose public regulation. The ultimate focus of the Court's position
became the extensive regulation proposed by the Roosevelt adminis-
tration during the New Deal period. The Court struck down a num-
ber of key laws.7" The story of the Court's change of heart after
President Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936 is well known.71 This
era demonstrates the unremarkable fact that even an isolated Court
cannot defy the focused disagreement of the executive and legislative
branches indefinitely.7"
In the post-World War II period, the Court has notably tried to
reconcile its confessed error in the economic rights cases with an in-
creasingly aggressive position in the protection of non-economic indi-
vidual rights. The touchstone was footnote 4 of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,73 which distinguishes between general regu-
lation on the one hand and the rights of discrete and insular minority
populations on the other.74 The Court's role is seen as reciprocal to
the poliical process. Where the political process is viewed as provid-
ing protection against excess economic regulation, the Court can
maintain a weak role in which it rarely interferes with Congress.
Minority groups, especially blacks because of their ancestry of
American slavery, were historically underrepresented in Congress
and in the benefits enacted., 75 The Court found itself justified in act-
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1984); Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review:
Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986).
70.' E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (regulation of coal production
improper because it is local activity); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural
Adjustment Act beyond congressional commerce power); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act exceeds congressional
commerce power and amounts to excessive delegation of authority); Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (act exceeds congressional commerce power).
71. Following his inauguration in January 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt launched an
attack on the Court and proposed that a new justice be appointed for every justice who re-
mained on the Court after he reached the age of seventy. He pleaded his case to Congress and
to the public through his radio addresses. See S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
Even though Roosevelt's plan was rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 1937,
the Court had already begun sustaining New Deal legislation. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
72. One can speculate about the role President Roosevelt's court packing proposal, S.
1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), played in bringing about the Court's eventual change of
heart. It is, in fact, a tribute to the strength of the Court that the proposal was defeated in
Congress. Conclusion of Adverse Report of Senate Judiciary Committee, June 14, 1937, S.
REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
73. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
74. See, e.g., Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (declaring racial school segregation
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ing more forcefully on their behalf. 6 Had the Court concerned itself
with a similar reciprocal role theory during the heyday of its review
of economic regulation, it might well have concluded that a strong
position was not called for. Unless one considers the wealthy to be a
discrete and insular minority in need of protection from the hordes
who would otherwise strip them of their wealth, it is difficult to find
a power imbalance worthy of Court strength. The wealthy have been
called on to provide a disproportionate share of national revenues
through progressive taxation, but have also been protected in the use
of their wealth to express their political ideas and to reward those
who agree with them." Indeed, the high costs of communication
have given some edge to candidates who can draw on personal
wealth in their campaigns. A number of well known multi-million-
aire political figures hold office today. 8 The author is not aware of a
significant wail of political impotency made either by or for the
wealthy.
Applying a theory of reciprocal strength to the issues of separa-
tion of power leads this author to conclude that the Court is grossly
overexerting itself in this field. Based simply on the ability of the
competing sides to persuade the people about their respective posi-
tions, the Court is clearly not needed. Anyone interested in the views
of either the administration or Congress respecting independent
counsel has but to consult the newspapers of the time. The President
of the United States is capable of taking issue with congressional
in Washington, D.C. unconstitutional).
76. Perhaps the difference is best seen in the standards applied in equal protection cases.
When a statute is attacked because its classification is economically unfair to a group that is
not otherwise specially protected, the Court reviews the statute under the rational relationship
standard which is so weak that only a single statute has been invalidated under it since World
War II. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). In New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976), the Court overruled Morey. (While this article was in revision, the Court declared a
West Virginia property tax formula unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989). This
probably did not change the bite of rationality review substantially however.) On the other
hand, if the classification is racial, strict scrutiny is applied requiring the government to justify
the classification by demonstrating a compelling interest. Under strict scrutiny, the classifica-
tion is presumed unconstitutional and the government rarely meets its heavy burden of proof.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
77. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating a law
which placed limit on personal contributions to support or oppose ballot measures); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a law restricting expenditures by
banks and other corporations on referendum issues). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (upholding spending limits in Federal Election Campaign Act).




perspectives publicly and articulately and Congress is not shy about
responding. If those two branches can reach an accommodation, as
they did in the passage of one house vetoes or Gramm-Rudman, in
whose interests need the Court intercede? Does anyone believe that
either Congress or the President would press a position that they
believed unconstitutional in the absence of a Court to correct them?
This is not to imply that the two branches are equal in power.
They are not-true scales would show that presidential power over-
whelms congressional power.79 This fact, of course, makes the Buck-
ley,80 Chadha1 and Bowsher82 decisions worse.
It would, in any event, be one thing for the Court to insist on a
clear and contrary position respecting legislative functions expressed
in the Constitution. If, for example, the Constitution expressly vested
in the executive branch the power to control the federal budget, one
might argue for a Court role in insuring adherence to the document
irrespective of whether the other branches needed bolstering. It is
difficult to imagine, however, that under such circumstances a Presi-
dent would have acquiesced in Gramm-Rudman.
Especially when the constitutional issue is based on an interpre-
tation of language quite inexplicit on the point, the Court might bet-
ter defer to the other branches that have experience in such matters.
Its insistence on being the decision maker is, in fact, a larger breach
of a proper doctrine of separation of powers than are the positions of
either the President or Congress in such matters.
In its cases discussing separation of powers, the Court has often
discussed separation of power as though the balance was to be struck
between two branches rather than among three.83 This position ob-
scures the fact that the Constitution indicates at least equal concern
that the courts be limited in power. The judicial power of the United
States is the most modestly endowed power of the three branches.
Aside from limited original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is only
given appellate power subject to congressional limitation and pro-
vided only with a set of such lower courts as Congress establishes.84
79. "The first concern is that the pivotal institution of the American government, the
Presidency, has got out of control and badly needs new definition and restraint." A. SCHLES-
INGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY X (1973).
80. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
81. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
82. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
83. Occasionally, the Court sees its own role in perspective. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Court is the improper branch to evaluate
congressional determination of essential state functions.).
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Perhaps in recognition of its powerlessness, the Court's principal
functionaries are given lifetime appointments and salary guaran-
tees."' The Court is awarded so little authority in constitutional ad-
judication by the express language of the Constitution that its own
self-adjudicated claim in Marbury v. Madison8" was needed to make
it a major participant.
One might review a number of prior cases from this perspective.
Two suffice to make the point. In United States v. Nixon,87 the
Court nominally considered whether the President could be com-
pelled to give testimony in a criminal prosecution of his former aides.
The case was understood by all concerned to have a far different
purpose. During the course of its consideration of a Bill of Impeach-
ment, the House of Representatives had become aware that the Pres-
ident had secretly taped conversations in the oval office. They
wanted to hear the tapes to resolve issues under consideration. Nixon
refused to release some of the tapes requested. Defense counsel to
several Watergate defendants also requested the tapes. The defend-
ants brought the issue to the courts." The President raised the stakes
after the case had reached the Supreme Court by indicating that he
would be bound only by a "definitive" opinion from the Court. 9
The Court met his challenge by issuing a unanimous opinion that he
release the tapes.90 Shortly ater, President Nixon resigned, never
having been impeached."
The Constitution is quite explicit as to how the impeachment of
a President is to take place. The process involves both houses of
Congress serially with the Chief Justice sitting in the Senate to pre-
side over the trial. 2 There is no other role prescribed for the Court.
To be sure, the Court was not speaking directly to impeachment in
Nixon, but it was on notice throughout the presentation of the case
that it was central to the process.
In other contexts, the Court has invoked its self-imposed doc-
trine of avoiding political questions to allow some issues to be re-
solved by a more appropriate branch. 8 Caught in the limelight of
85. Id.
86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
87. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
88. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 287 (1979).
89. Id. at 292.
90. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
91. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 88, at 347.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
93. E.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (The Court refused to hear chal-
lenge to Vietnam war.).
[Vol. 29
SEPARATION OF POWERS
national publicity, it did not use that tactic in Nixon.94 In a manner
far more blatantly circumventing constitutionally established proce-
dures than was true of the Gramm-Rudman scheme, the Court de-
cided it was the appropriate branch to act.
Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack5 the Court asserted the
right to resolve the question of who was to be seated in Congress.
Adam Clayton Powell was elected to a seat in Congress. His career
was colorful in many respects. He was thought to be eluding civil
process in his home state and allegedly had misapplied House funds.
That he was black probably added to the furor in Congress. The
House of Representatives voted to refuse to seat him based on his
misdeeds. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the House pos-
sessed no power to unseat Powell because he met the three express
qualifications of office: age, citizenship and residency.96 It did not
appear to trouble the Court that judging the qualifications of mem-
bers of Congress is expressly allocated to Congress in the Constitu-
tion.9 Again, the pertinent provision appears far more clearly ex-
pressed than the Constitutional prohibition against using officers
such as the Comptroller General for such duties as Gramm-Rudman
budget cuts or court appointment of independent counsel. 8
In both Nixon and Powell, the Court did more than assume a
role this author asserts was given to another branch. In both cases,
the Court undermined Congress by patronizingly performing its
functions. Neither impeachment nor the refusal to seat a black repre-
sentative from a black district are politically easy actions. By depriv-
ing Congress of the experience of dealing with such tasks, the Court
94. The resulting opinion was weak, probably because the Court felt a need to avoid the
presidential challenge of disobedience to a small majority. Incidentally, the Court established
grounds for invoking an underdeveloped doctrine of executive privilege, which will make it
harder to reach presidential papers in the future. Notwithstanding the weakness of the opin-
ion, it accelerated the departure of Richard Nixon.
95. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
97. "Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own members
.... .U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
98. The constitutional provision that authorizes a refusal to seat allows House resolu-
tion by a mere majority rather than the two thirds vote required to expel, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2. A mere majority could refuse to seat a member and the majority party might in the
future abuse the provision, disadvantaging the minority party. Such abuse is, of course, purely
speculative since it never happened. The vote in favor of refusing to seat was carried by more
than the two-thirds majority required to expel. However, it is not clear that all of those voting
would have also voted to expel. If the Court had indicated that the matter was not justiciable
because of the constitutional allocation of power to Congress, the majority party trying to
unseat their opponents would be forced to defend their political action politically. That is, they
would not have the Court's imprimatur on their interpretation of their own power.
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also diminished the role of the Legislature as a responsible body.
The decisions that needed to be made were difficult and many mem-
bers of Congress were no doubt pleased that their votes would not be
recorded. However, if those people were part of the body constitu-
tionally empowered to perform such tasks, the Court should have
permitted them to act, perhaps even to fail.
It should not be forgotten that the Court is the least democratic
branch of government. It is intentionally insulated to make counter-
majoritarian decisions when the majority threatens a minority inter-
est protected by the Constitution. When there is no apparent minor-
ity in need of protection, and especially when the Constitution has
itself expressly reserved the matter for resolution by a democratically
responsible branch, Court resolution equals arrogation.
RESOLVING PROBLEMS WITHOUT SUPREME COURT
INTERVENTION
If the Court ought not to dispose of issues such as the indepen-
dent counsel dispute, how are they to be resolved? The Court's no-
tion that compartmentalization, with or without consideration of all
of the circumstances, provides the right answer is dubious. Why the
two great strict constructionists who wrote the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Morrison both avoided leaving the issue to the people
is difficult to understand. The possibility of partisan bias exists no
matter which branch is directed to appoint prosecutors to investigate
those too close to the administration, or to Congress,99 in order to
assure the appearance of fairness. Of the three branches, the least
threatening is the Court because, as a matter of history and self-
description, it has always performed the task best. So the present
solution seems to be a wise one. Even if Congress shifts the balance
unfairly against the presidency, would not the electorate be able to
respond to that unfairness? The Reagan administration was not shy
in opposing the application of the independent counsel law and sup-
porting a political as well as legal challenge to it.'00 Congress has
99. 53 Fed. Reg. 31,322 (1988) (amending 28 C.F.R. Part 0).
100. See, e.g., Agronsky, Meese v. Miranda: The Final Countdown, 73 A.B.A. J. 86
(1987); Ball, The Convergence of Constitutional Law and Politics in the Reagan Administra-
tion: The Exhumation of the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention" Doctrine, 17 CUMB. L.
REV. 877 (1987).
It is interesting to note that the former Attorney General who has so forcefully insisted
that the Constitution be read literally, seems doubtful of the congressional authority to author-
ize courts to appoint independent counsel to prosecute executive misconduct. Tragically, the
primary independent counsel in charge of matters related to the Iran-Contra controversies,
Lawrence Walsh, has agreed with the former Attorney General's concern and has taken an
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been forced to make its rationale explicit to the public as well as to
the Court. If, in some future act, Congress truly passes an unfair
law, cannot the victimized President marshall support? At least in
recent history, it has not appeared to this author that any President
has been so powerless. Justice Scalia may be right that the central
issue in Morrison is "power." Perhaps the real difference between
him and his colleagues is that he alone can bring himself to complain
that the President of the United States is, as a practical matter, una-
ble to defend himself.
appointment to the Department of Justice to assure his legitimacy. Still Probing for Answers,
TIME, Mar. 16, 1987, at 27. As the author has indicated, the second appointment leaves open
the problems that faced Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox when he was fired by President
Nixon. Alexander, Special Prosecutor Trap, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 9, 1987, at 4, col. 3. Ironi-
cally, Mr. Meese was, at the time, himself being investigated by an independent counsel.
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